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How individuals divide resources between themselves and another person is influenced
both by their social value orientation (SVO) and the emotions they expect to feel when
dividing resources (anticipated emotions). Research has also shown that individuals
favor members of their own group (ingroup) over individuals from other groups
(outgroup) when allocating resources. The Malaysian multi-ethnic population is a highly
relevant context to study the combined effects of intergroup relations and SVO on
anticipated emotions and resource allocation. The current studies recruited Malaysian
participants to examine whether anticipated emotions and allocation behavior are
influenced by the ethnic identity of the person receiving the allocation. Participants
completed an SVO measure and rated how they would feel if they were to share
resources equally or unequally. They then made allocations between themselves and an
ingroup or outgroup member in an economic game. There was no evidence of ingroup
favoritism in anticipated emotions and allocation behavior. This may have been due to
impression management, social desirability concerns, and/or the use of a population
with socially liberal attitudes. The results nevertheless provide support for the notion
that anticipated emotions play a key role in resource allocation decisions.
Keywords: social value orientation, anticipated emotions, ingroup favoritism, allocation behavior, economic
games
INTRODUCTION
Both individual dispositional preferences and anticipated emotions are known to affect fairness
and cooperative behavior (Mellers and McGraw, 2001; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). For instance,
allocators with a dispositional preference to be fair anticipate more cooperative emotions and
fewer competitive emotions when allocating resources, and these anticipated emotions lead to
fairer allocations to others (Bono et al., unpublished). At the same time, individuals tend to favor
members of their own group (ingroup) over individuals from other groups (outgroup) when
allocating resources (Ben-Ner et al., 2009). In the current research, we investigate whether the
emotions that an individual anticipates when deciding how to allocate resources and the actual
resource allocations are influenced by the social identity of the person receiving the allocation. We
also explore whether this is moderated by individual differences in social value orientation (SVO).
Individual differences in SVO are known to affect the way that individuals allocate resources
in an economic game (Messick and McClintock, 1968). SVO is commonly categorized into
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three orientations; prosocial, individualistic, and competitive
(Van Lange et al., 1997). Prosocials prefer to minimize the
difference in resources between themselves and others or to
maximize both their own and others’ outcomes. Individualists
prefer to maximize their own payoff. Competitive individuals
prefer to maximize the difference between their own and others’
outcomes. In past research, individualists and competitors are
usually combined into a single “proself ” category (Haesevoets
et al., 2015), a term that we will adopt here.
Individual differences in SVO have been demonstrated to
affect behavior in experimental social dilemmas such as the
prisoner’s dilemma, the public goods dilemma, and the commons
dilemma (Balliet et al., 2009). Because prosocials tend to choose
options that maximize joint outcomes, they cooperate more
than proselfs do. Proselfs tend to choose outcomes that benefit
themselves and therefore cooperate less. In a recent meta-analysis
(Pletzer et al., 2018), prosocials and proselfs were found to
differ in their expectations of others; more specifically, prosocials
expect others to cooperate more, and this increases their
cooperative behavior.
Other economic games that have been used to investigate
the relation between SVO and allocation behavior include the
ultimatum game (UG; Güth et al., 1982) and the dictator game
(DG; Kahneman et al., 1986). Both games involve two players
who have distinct roles. One (the allocator) makes an allocation
between him/herself and the other (the receiver). The games
differ only with respect to the role of the receiver. In the UG,
the receiver can either accept or reject the proposed allocation.
If the allocation is accepted, the allocator and receiver receive the
proposed allocation. If the proposed allocation is rejected, neither
player receives anything. The UG allocation therefore contains
a strategic component. The allocator has to estimate the level at
which his or her offer might be rejected by the receiver. In the
DG, on the other hand, the receiver has to accept the proposed
allocation made by the allocator. The DG is therefore considered
to be a “purer” measure of fairness in allocation behavior. Because
no strategic component is involved, it is assumed that allocators
behave in accordance with their dispositional preferences.
Past research has also shown that individuals are affected by
the emotions that they anticipate experiencing as a consequence
of their decision making. For example, anticipated pride about
being fair and anticipated regret about being unfair predicts
cooperative resource allocation behavior (Van Der Schalk
et al., 2012). Similarly, an individual may behave in a more
desirable way (perhaps more morally) in order to avoid feeling
disappointment (Zeelenberg et al., 2000; Gill and Prowse, 2012).
In a study investigating divorce negotiation, guilt was reported
to enhance cooperative behaviors (Wietzker et al., 2012). Feeling
shameful when one fails to act morally was also found to motivate
prosocial behavior (De Hooge et al., 2008). Furthermore, results
show that anticipated emotions can both increase and decrease
cooperative and competitive behaviors. For example, anticipating
feeling proud about being unfair can lead people to share less of
their resources (Van Der Schalk et al., 2012; see also Dorfman
et al., 2014). Similarly, anticipated regret and guilt about being
fair can lead people to share fewer resources (Ketelaar and Tung
Au, 2003; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012).
Bono et al. (unpublished) investigated the relation between
SVO, anticipated emotions, and allocation behavior, and
experimentally varied anticipated emotions by means of
an emotion regulation manipulation. Results showed that
anticipated emotions function as a psychological link between
individual differences in SVO and resource allocation decisions,
and there was evidence suggesting that the typically observed
relation between SVO and allocation behavior was disrupted
when individuals were instructed to upregulate or downregulate
their anticipated emotions. Overall, Bono et al. (unpublished)
showed that allocators with a dispositional preference to be
fair (prosocials) anticipated more cooperative emotions (pride
about being fair, regret about being unfair), and that these
cooperative emotions help to explain why prosocials tend to make
more fair decisions.
Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) argues
that individuals derive part of their identity from the groups
they belong to and that this contributes to their self-esteem.
Individuals are therefore motivated to find attributes of their
groups that positively distinguish them from other groups. In an
intergroup setting, social identity becomes salient and individuals
are inclined to search for positive ingroup differentiation. Some
researchers have used economic games to study differences in
allocation behavior toward ingroup and outgroup members,
and found that allocators gave more resources to ingroup
members than to outgroup members (Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Balliet
et al., 2014). Participants also tend to be more cooperative or
prosocial toward others with whom they share a cultural/national
background than to those with a dissimilar cultural/national
background (Fiedler et al., 2018). This ingroup favoritism, or
tendency to favor ingroup members over outgroup members, is
consistent with the social identity theory argument that group
members will search for ways to distinguish the ingroup from an
outgroup in ways that reflect well on the ingroup. Furthermore,
there is evidence that the extent to which group members identify
with their ingroup moderates ingroup favoritism, such that high
identifiers are more likely to display such favoritism (e.g., Hinkle
et al., 1989; Sidanius et al., 1994; Levin and Sidanius, 1999).
In the current studies, we investigate how the multi-ethnic
context of Malaysia affects the emotions that citizens expect
to feel when allocating resources equally or unequally between
themselves and others, and how they actually make such
allocations. Malaysia’s population consists of three main ethnic
groups, Malay (69.1%), Chinese (23%), and Indians (6.9%), and
others (1%) (Department of Statistics, 2018). As a result of
colonial history, Malays and other indigenous groups are labeled
“bumiputra” (Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981; Khattab, 2016).
“Bumiputra” means “sons of the soil” in the Malay language. This
term is used to distinguish Malays and other indigenous groups
from Chinese and Indians (non-bumiputra). Bumiputras have
bumiputra privileges, which means they receive more educational
and economic assistance from the Malaysian government
(Pietsch and Clark, 2014). This policy was implemented by the
Malaysian government in 1970 in its New Economic Policy
(NEP) (Jomo and Sundaram, 2004; Brown, 2007) to help
the bumiputras who, at the time, were faring less well than
the non-bumiputras. This policy was also intended to help
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the different ethnic groups reach harmony, particularly in the
economic and education field (Montesino, 2012; Mokhtar et al.,
2017). However, this policy has raised issues of inequality between
the bumiputras and non-bumiputras due to the amount of help
the bumiputras receive from the government (Tyson et al., 2017).
This in turn has also contributed to segregation between the
ethnic groups within the society (Montesino, 2012; Cheong
et al., 2016; Tyson et al., 2017). Because of the strained relations
between the different ethnic groups, Malaysia is a relevant context
in which to investigate differences in allocation toward ingroup
and outgroup members. In the present research, we recruited
participants from the three main ethnic groups: Malay, Chinese,
and Indian. Each group is distinct in terms of culture, traditions,
and religion. The Malays are the majority group (being the
largest of the three) while Chinese and Indians are minority
groups. When the terms “ingroup” and “outgroup” are used
in the paper, this is always with reference to the ethnic group
of the allocator. For example, for Malays, ingroup members
are Malays and outgroup members are Chinese and Indians.
Similarly, for Chinese participants, ingroup members are Chinese
and outgroup members are Malays and Indians. The same applies
to Indians, for whom outgroup members are Malays and Chinese.
Bumiputra status is only relevant when it comes to dividing
participants into members of “majority” versus “minority”
groups. When these terms (“majority” and “minority”) are used,
we divided the ethnic groups based solely on their “bumiputra”
and “non-bumiputra” status, bearing Malaysian history in mind.
Conducting the research in Malaysia also enabled us to examine
whether Bono et al. (unpublished) findings would replicate in a
non-Western culture, thereby addressing a known limitation of
much psychological research (see Henrich et al., 2010).
The current research consists of two studies. In Study 1,
our primary aim was to investigate differences in allocation
behavior toward ingroup and outgroup receivers. We predicted
that participants would allocate more tokens to ingroup members
than to outgroup members. It is known that allocators are
more likely to be cooperative (and therefore to make fairer
allocations) toward ingroup than toward outgroup members.
For example, previous research has shown that participants tend
to be more cooperative or prosocial toward others with whom
they share a cultural/national background than to those with
a dissimilar cultural/national background (e.g., Fiedler et al.,
2018). Given that individuals tend to prefer more equal outcomes
between themselves and a member of their own group than
between themselves and a member of an outgroup (Ben-Ner
et al., 2009; Balliet et al., 2014), and given that individuals
who are more likely to be fair in resource allocations tend
to anticipate more cooperative emotions (e.g., Van Der Schalk
et al., 2012), we hypothesize that individuals will experience
more cooperative emotions when allocating to ingroup receivers
then when allocating to outgroup receivers. We also predicted
that ingroup identification would be positively associated with
ingroup favoritism, given the previously mentioned evidence that
high identifiers are more likely to engage in ingroup favoritism.
A further aim was to examine how allocation behavior was
affected by SVO. We examined whether in-group favoritism
in allocation behavior would be moderated by SVO. We also
investigated whether the effect of SVO on allocation behavior
was mediated by anticipated emotions (Bono et al., unpublished).
We predicted that prosocial participants would make larger
allocations to others than would proself participants and would
also anticipate more cooperative emotions, with the differences in
allocation behavior being mediated by differences in anticipated
emotions. In Study 2, our main aim was to re-examine the
prediction that there would be a difference in allocation behavior
toward ingroup and outgroup members. We also took the
opportunity to explore the social dominance theory explanation
for any differences in the allocation behavior of minority





The study had a 3 (Allocator group: Chinese, Indian, and Malay;
quasi-experimental between-subjects factor) × 3 (Receiver
group: Chinese, Indian and Malay; within-subjects factor) mixed
design. We recruited 123 Malaysians (97 females, 25 males, one
undisclosed, Mage = 25.23, SD = 2.94) from the three major ethnic
groups, Chinese (N = 43), Indians (N = 38), and Malays (N = 42).
Participants were 44 students, one unemployed, 78 employed.
Recruitment was done through social media and snowballing.
Each participant was given a RM15 (approximately £3) gift
voucher for their time and were entered into a lucky draw in
which four pairs had a chance to win a voucher worth RM60
(approximately £11) each. The questionnaire was administered
online using a survey site (Qualtrics).
Materials
Index of cooperative and competitive emotion (ICE) measure
To measure anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions,
participants were asked to rate how they would feel about division
of tokens, using a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much)
to indicate the extent to which they would feel each of six
emotions: pleased, proud, regretful, disappointed, guilty, and
ashamed. These six emotion terms were chosen to capture three
emotion constructs: pride, regret, and guilt. The terms pleased
and proud were selected to index pride; the terms regretful and
disappointed were selected to index regret; and the terms guilty
and ashamed were selected to index guilt. This was based on
the shared positive valence of the terms pleased and proud
(Tracy and Robins, 2007; Van Osch et al., 2018); the shared
counterfactual character of regretful and disappointed (where the
person experiencing the emotion can imagine a better state of
affairs if he or she had acted or chosen differently; Zeelenberg and
Pieters, 2007); and the shared self-blame character of the terms
guilty and ashamed (where the person appears to feel that he or
she is responsible for bringing about an unwanted state of affairs;
Niedenthal et al., 1994; Haidt, 2003). The measure consists of
12 scenarios that represented equal [12:12 and 21:21 (Chinese),
9:9 and 24:24 (Indian), 15:15 and 18:18 (Malay)] and unequal
[16:8 and 28:14 (Chinese), 12:6 and 32:16 (Indian), 20:10 and
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24:12 (Malay)] allocations toward others who belonged to one
of the three ethnic groups (Chinese, Indian, and Malay). For
each ethnic group, ethnically appropriate names were used to
designate the receiver, who was always the same gender as the
allocator [Chinese: Siew Ling or Sui Mei (female) and Chi Yung
or Jian Hong (male), Indian: Shantini or Lakshimi (female) and
Viknesh or Kumar (male), and Malay: Nurul or Aini (female) and
Ali or Samad (male)]. Each item was presented in random order.
For example, one item asked participants to imagine that there
were 36 tokens at stake, and the participant decides to allocate
24 tokens for him/herself and 12 tokens to the other person.
Participants are then asked to rate how they would feel about
this division of tokens. Definitions of each emotion were given
in both English and the Malay language to make sure participants
understood their meaning. English definitions were taken from
the Oxford online dictionary and Malay definitions were taken
from the Dewan Pustaka and Bahasa online dictionary.
For the anticipated emotions measure scores, we created index
scores for cooperative and competitive emotions (ICE scores) by
calculating the difference between responses on items relating
to the fair and the unfair scenarios, in such a way that higher
scores always reflected more cooperative emotions. For example,
to calculate ICE-pride, the score for anticipated pride about
being unfair was subtracted from the score for anticipated pride
about being fair. Similarly, to calculate ICE-regret and ICE-guilt,
the scores relating to fair scenarios were subtracted from the
corresponding scores relating to unfair scenarios. These indices
can be interpreted in such a way that a negative score reflects
anticipating more competitive emotions, whereas a positive
score reflects anticipating more cooperative emotions, with a
zero indicating no difference in the anticipation of cooperative
and competitive emotions. The correlations between the pride,
regret, and guilt sub-scales of the measure were substantial (rs
ranged from 0.721 to 0.925). For reasons of conciseness, below
we report the results for the overall index of cooperative and
competitive emotions, averaged across all emotion items (ICE).
Cronbach’s alphas for the measure were high: ICEMalay = 0.918,
ICEChinese = 0.919, ICEIndian = 0.915 (distinguished by receiver
ethnic group, not respondent ethnic group).
Social value orientation
Social value orientation was assessed using the SVO Slider
Measure (SVO-SM) (Murphy et al., 2011). This requires
participants to choose their preferred allocation between
themselves and the recipient (an anonymous other). The
SVO-SM has six primary items. Each consists of nine allocation
options, where each option corresponds to a certain amount of
points to the allocator and to the receiver. Responses are used to
calculate the degree of prosociality.
Allocation behavior
Each participant took the role of allocator in a DG (Kahneman
et al., 1986). In this game, allocators decide how to divide
resources between themselves and another, who has to accept
the allocation. Allocators were given 30 tokens to divide between
him/herself and an opponent who (by virtue of the same names
being presented as in the ICE measure) belonged to one of the
three ethnic groups. Participants were told that the tokens had
monetary value, in the sense that tokens gained would be paid
out in real money if they won a lottery. On completing the survey,
participants were automatically entered into lucky draw in which
they could win a gift voucher worth up to a maximum of RM60
(approximately £11).
Ingroup identity measure (IIM)
The IIM (Leach et al., 2008) assesses ingroup identification.
This 14-item measure consists of two second-order
factors: self-definition (which in turn consists of individual
self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity) and self-investment
(which in turn consists of satisfaction, solidarity, and centrality).
Example items are “I feel a bond with [ethnic ingroup]”
(indexes solidarity) and “I have a lot in common with the
average [ethnic ingroup]” (indexes individual self-stereotyping).
Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed
with each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to
5 (strongly disagree). The content of the IIM was tailored to
each respondent’s ethnicity, such that respondents were only
presented with items relating to their own ethnic ingroup.
Cronbach’s alphas for the IIM were high: IIMMalay = 0.909,
IIMChinese = 0.919, and IIMIndian = 0.953.
Attention check
An attention check presented participants with some text related
to emotions and they were given three options to choose from.
However, they were asked not to click on any of the options
given and to move on to the next question. Participants failed the
attention check if they clicked on one of the provided options.
Procedure
Participants first completed a consent form. Next, they completed
demographic items (ethnic group, age, gender, fluency in
English, and occupation). They were then asked to complete the
SVO-SM and the IIM in a randomized order. Next, participants
were shown the definitions of the emotions that they would
be presented in the ICE measure. They then reported their
anticipated emotions for the 12 different allocation scenarios
of the ICE measure, in a randomized order. Next, participants
completed the attention check and then played three DGs (one
for each ethnicity: Chinese, Indian, and Malay, in a randomized
order) to measure their allocation behavior. Participants were
then asked whether they had taken their participation seriously.
Finally, they were debriefed. Two pairs of participants were
randomly picked for the lottery. They were paid out RM60
(approximately £11) that was the maximum possible winnings
of the allocation in gift vouchers because participants were not
actually paired with another participant.
Results
Data Treatment
Of the 123 Malaysians recruited, data from 105 individuals
(Mage = 25.33, SD = 2.86) were retained for analysis.
There were 22 males, 82 females, and one participant with
undisclosed gender. The retained participants included 35
Chinese, 33 Indians, and 37 Malays, of whom 34 were students,
one was unemployed, and 68 were employed (two missing
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occupation data). Data from participants who failed the attention
check (N = 7), admitted that they were not serious in answering
the questionnaire (N = 3), or took longer than 2.5 times the
median response time (Mdn = 19.35, N = 8) were dropped.
Exploration of the allocation data revealed that it was not
continuous and not unbounded: The modal response for number
of tokens offered was 15 and all other responses tended to
be restricted to certain categories (e.g., 10). In light of this,
we used non-parametric tests to investigate the effects of
conditions on allocation behavior. For regression-based analyses
(i.e., mediation analyses), we followed the procedure of Van
der Schalk et al. (2015) by dichotomizing the allocation scores:
offers ≥ 15 were recoded as “fair” and offers ≤14 were recoded
as “unfair.” Regression-based analyses of the allocation behavior
data were therefore calculated using logistic regression. For
analyses of all other measures, we used parametric tests (i.e., t-test
and ANOVA). Correlations between the measures can be found
in Table 1.
A sensitivity test using G∗Power software (Faul et al., 2007,
2009) showed that the current study had sufficient power
(1 – β = 0.80) to find a small effect of Cohen dz = 0.025
(Cohen, 1969, p. 38).
Anticipated Emotions Toward Ingroup and Outgroup
Receivers
A t-test showed that participants did not differ in their
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions toward
ingroup (M = 1.14, SD = 1.32) and outgroup (M = 1.18,
SD = 1.31) members, t(102) = -0.72, p = 0.471. It was
further explored whether participants from each ethnic group
differed in their anticipated cooperative and competitive
emotions toward receivers from different ethnic groups by
conducting a 3 (Allocator group: Chinese, Indian, and Malay;
quasi-experimental between-subjects factor) × 3 (Receiver
group: Chinese, Indian, and Malay; within-subjects factor) mixed
ANOVA. There were no significant main effects for receivers’
ethnic group, F(2,202) = 2.14, p = 0.121, or for allocators’ ethnic
group, F(2,101) = 1.82, p = 0.168 on anticipated emotions.
There was also no significant interaction between receivers’
and allocators’ ethnic group, F(4,202) = 0.59, p = 0.672. This
shows that Chinese, Indians, and Malays did not differ in their
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions toward the
three ethnic groups.
Allocation Behavior
When comparing participants’ allocation behavior toward
ingroup and outgroup receivers, a Wilcoxon signed rank test
showed that participants did not differ in their allocation behavior
toward ingroup (M = 13.79, SD = 3.44, Mdn = 15.00) and
outgroup receivers (M = 13.86, SD = 2.99, Mdn = 15.00),
Z = -0.24, p = 0.810. We further explored how each of the ethnic
groups allocated their resources to the three receiver groups.
We conducted three separate Friedman’s ANOVA tests, one for
each allocator group, where we examined the allocations to three
receiver groups. It was found that none of the ethnic groups
differed significantly in their allocations to the ethnic receiver
groups, χ2Malay(2) = 0.06, p = 0.972; χ2Chinese(2) = 1.40, p = 0.497;
and χ2Indian(2) = 2.38, p = 0.304.
The Spearman’s correlations between SVO and allocations
to ingroup and outgroup members were virtually identical
(see Table 1), suggesting that although SVO was significantly
associated with allocations to receivers in the expected fashion,
the strength of this relation was not moderated by whether the
receiver is an ingroup or outgroup member. This was confirmed
by splitting the sample at the median SVO score into participants
low and high in SVO, and using a Wilcoxon signed rank test
to compare their allocations to ingroup and outgroup receivers.
Participants low in SVO did not differ in their allocations to
ingroup (M = 12.98, SD = 4.50, Mdn = 15.00) and outgroup
receivers (M = 13.16, SD = 3.72, Mdn = 15.00), Z = -0.07,
p = 0.944. Likewise, participants high in SVO did not differ in
their allocation to ingroup (M = 14.64, SD = 1.27, Mdn = 15.00)
and outgroup receivers (M = 14.61, SD = 1.67, Mdn = 15.00),
Z = -0.41, p = 0.686. This again shows that the amount allocated
to ingroup and outgroup receivers was not moderated by SVO.
To examine whether allocation behavior was affected by
strength of ingroup identification, we calculated Spearman’s rho
correlations between the IIM scores for each ethnic group and
allocation behavior toward ingroup and outgroup members.
None of the correlations between IIM scores and allocation
behavior toward ingroup [rMalay(37) = -0.021, p = 0.903;
rChinese(35) = -0.089, p = 0.613; rIndian(31) = 0.001, p = 0.995]










Tokens allocated to ingroup receivers 0.838∗∗∗ − − − − –
Tokens allocated to outgroup receivers 0.805∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ − − − –
SVO 0.309∗∗∗ 0.229∗ 0.233∗ − − –
ICE 0.303∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.199∗ 0.345∗∗∗ − –
IIM −0.132 −0.036 −0.132 −0.180 −0.333∗∗∗ –
n 103 103 103 105 104 104
M 13.83 13.79 13.86 30.13 1.17 4.58
SD 2.96 3.44 2.99 11.86 1.28 1.08
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
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and outgroup members [rMalay(37) = -0.016, p = 0.927;
rChinese(35) = -0.219, p = 0.206; rIndian(31) = -0.152, p = 0.415]
were significant.
For exploratory purposes, we also examined whether the
ethnic groups differed in their overall allocation behavior.
A Kruskal–Wallis test comparing Malay (M = 13.31, SD = 3.02,
Mdn = 15.00), Chinese (M = 13.75, SD = 3.54, Mdn = 15.00),
and Indian (M = 14.51, SD = 1.95, Mdn = 15.00) allocators
showed that their allocation behavior toward others (irrespective
of the receivers’ ethnicity) differed marginally from what would
be expected by chance, χ2(2) = 5.38, p = 0.068. When participants
were grouped according to their majority (Malays) and minority
(Chinese and Indians) group status in the Malaysian society, a
Mann–Whitney U-test showed that majority group allocators
(M = 13.31, SD = 3.02, Mdn = 15.00) allocated significantly less
to others (irrespective of the receivers’ ethnicity) than minority
group allocators (M = 14.11, SD = 2.90, Mdn = 15.00), U = 947.50,
Z = -2.317, p = 0.020.
We then explored the difference between the majority
group and the minority group in anticipated cooperative and
competitive emotions toward ingroup and outgroup members,
using a 2 (majority vs. minority allocator, between-subjects) × 2
(ingroup vs. outgroup receiver, within-subjects) mixed ANOVA.
There was no significant main effect of receivers’ group
membership, F(1,101) = 1.01, p = 0.318, but there was
a marginal main effect of allocators’ group membership,
F(1,101) = 3.91, p = 0.051, on anticipated emotions toward
others, whereby minority group participants anticipated more
cooperative emotions (M = 1.34, SD = 1.34) than did participants
belonging to the majority group (M = 0.85, SD = 1.13). The
interaction between allocators’ and receivers’ group membership
was not significant, F(1,101) = 1.20, p = 0.276.
Mediation Analyses
Bono et al. (unpublished) found that the effect of SVO on
allocation behavior was mediated by anticipated emotions. To
investigate whether this pattern would be replicated in a non-
Western sample, a mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro
(Model 4) was carried out to test whether anticipated emotions
(ICE) mediated the relation between SVO and allocation
behavior (see Figure 1). This analysis showed that the total effect
of SVO on tokens allocated in DG was positive and significant,
and that there was a positive and significant effect of SVO on
ICE, revealing that prosocials tended to allocate more to others
and also anticipated more cooperative emotions. There was also
FIGURE 1 | Indirect effect of social value orientation on dichotomized
averaged tokens allocated to the receiver (irrespective of ethnicity) in the
Dictator Game through ICE. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001 (Study 1).
a significant effect of ICE on allocation behavior. Moreover, the
indirect effect of SVO on allocation behavior through ICE was
significant, b = 0.02, 95% CI [0.010, 0.050], and the effect of SVO
on allocation behavior was no longer significant when controlling
for anticipated emotions, suggesting full mediation.
Because there were no significant effects of receivers’ group
membership on allocation behavior or on allocators’ anticipated
emotions, the indirect effect of group membership on allocation
behavior via anticipated emotions could not be tested. However,
because there was a significant difference in allocation behavior
between the majority and minority groups, a second mediation
analysis was conducted to test whether the effect of allocators’
group majority/minority status on allocation behavior was
mediated by anticipated emotions (see Figure 2). This showed
that the direct effect of group membership on tokens allocated
was significant, and that the effect of group membership on
ICE was marginally significant. In addition, ICE predicted
allocation behavior, and the effect of group membership on
allocation behavior was no longer significant when controlling
for ICE. More importantly, the indirect effect of group on
allocation behavior through ICE was significant, b = 0.35, 95%
CI [0.002, 0.904].
Discussion
The finding that differences in anticipated emotions mediated
the effect of SVO on allocation behavior replicates the finding of
Bono et al. (unpublished) that those with a prosocial disposition
anticipate more cooperative emotions (pride about being fair,
regret, and guilt about being unfair) and fewer competitive
emotions (pride about being unfair, regret, and guilt about being
fair), and that it is these anticipated cooperative and competitive
emotions that are responsible for individual differences in
allocation behavior. The current findings show that this pattern
of mediation can be replicated in a non-Western culture.
Surprisingly, there was no support for the prediction that
individuals would allocate fewer resources to outgroup members
and would anticipate less cooperative emotions toward outgroup
others. This stands in contrast to the ingroup favoritism in
allocation behavior observed by other researchers (Forsythe
et al., 1994; Berg et al., 1995; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Liebe and
Tutic, 2010). This may be because participants played three DGs
consecutively with members of the three different ethnic groups,
in a within-subjects design. This may have made them aware
of the fact that the ethnicity of the other to whom they were
FIGURE 2 | Indirect effect of allocator’s group membership (majority vs.
minority) on dichotomized averaged tokens allocated to the receiver
(irrespective of ethnicity) in the Dictator Game through ICE. *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01 (Study 1).
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making allocations was being varied. Impression management
concerns may have led participants to refrain from allocating
resources unequally between themselves and members of the
different ethnic groups.
Nevertheless, when participants were re-classified into
majority or minority groups, we found that minority
group members were more likely than their majority group
counterparts to make fair allocations to receivers and tended
to anticipate fewer cooperative emotions (regardless of the
receiver’s ethnicity). Social dominance theory (Pratto et al.,
1994) offers a way to account for this difference in allocation
behavior between majority and minority groups. This theory
postulates that forming group-based hierarchies is a universal
human tendency and that hierarchical social order is maintained
through individual and institutional discrimination. In order
for high status groups to maintain their position, they promote
practices that enhance inequality. Lower status groups strive to be
on par with the higher status group. The theory also identifies an
individual difference in preference for hierarchical relationships
between groups, which is termed social dominance orientation
(SDO; Pratto et al., 1994). As noted earlier, in the Malaysian
context, the majority (bumiputras) group enjoys higher status
than the two minority groups (Chinese and Indians). In light of
social dominance theory, it could be argued that the bumiputras
acted less fairly in the present study in order to maintain
prevailing status differences, whereas non-bumiputras acted
more fairly in order to promote equality between groups.
Research has also shown that advantaged group members have
higher SDO scores than disadvantaged members, and that
this is related to increased prejudice against disadvantaged
members (Guimond et al., 2003). Likewise, it has been found
that individuals higher in SDO are more likely to endorse social
inequality and more likely to discriminate against members of
disadvantaged groups (Ho et al., 2015).
Because this effect of majority/minority status on allocation
behavior was found in an exploratory analysis, we sought to
replicate the effect in a follow-up study. We also took the
opportunity to measure respondents’ SDO. If differences in
allocation behavior between majority and minority groups reflect
differences in SDO, there should be a negative relationship
between SDO scores and allocation behavior, such that
individuals with a high SDO score, who prefer to maintain or
even increase the differences in social status of different groups,
should allocate less to others, perhaps especially when those
others are members of lower status (minority) groups.
Additionally, despite the fact that the effect of group
membership on ICE was only marginally significant, the
significant indirect effect of group membership on allocations via
anticipated cooperative emotions suggests that the difference in
allocation behavior between majority and minority groups is, at
least in part, explained by differences in anticipated emotions.
This again illustrates the key role that anticipated emotions play
in resource allocation decisions.
In Study 2, we changed the design of the study from
a within-subjects to a between-subjects design, in order to
minimize the influence of social desirability factors. By switching
to a between-subjects design, the manipulation of the opponent’s
social group identity should be less transparent. We also sought
to recruit a bigger sample in order to rule out the possibility that
the lack of evidence for differences in allocations to ingroup and
outgroup members in Study 1 was due to lack of power. A further
change from Study 1 was that we used the UG (Güth et al.,
1982) instead of the DG. The UG differs from the DG in that the
receiver has the option to reject a proposed allocation, in which
case neither player receives any allocation. The UG therefore has
a strategic component in the sense that the allocator needs to
consider how the receiver would react to a proposed allocation,
and this should increase participants’ engagement with the game.
STUDY 2
The main aim of Study 2 was to re-examine the prediction
that there would be a difference in allocation behavior toward
ingroup and outgroup members. A further aim was to explore
the social dominance theory explanation for the difference in
allocation behavior of minority and majority group allocators
toward others (regardless of the receivers’ ethnicity) found in
Study 1. Social dominance theory argues that persons high
in SDO have a preference for hierarchical social relations
and are more accepting of inequality. Individual differences in
SDO might therefore predict allocation behavior. A measure of
SDO was added to investigate the extent to which preferences
for group-based hierarchies could account for the effect of
majority–minority groups status. We predicted that majority
group members would have higher SDO scores than their
minority group counterparts. We also explored the combined
effects of allocator’s group membership (majority vs. minority),




This study had a 3 (Allocator group: Malay, Chinese, and
Indian) × 3 (Receiver group: Chinese, Indian, and Malay)
between-subjects design. There were 565 participants (435
females, 129 males, one other, Mage = 23, SD = 4.142) recruited
for this study. Of these, 243 were Chinese, 222 were Malay, 65
were Indians, 22 were of mixed ethnicity, and 13 were from
other ethnic groups. Participants were recruited from Malaysian
universities through social media and mass emailing to groups
of classes with the help of staff. Participants were all students.
As an incentive, all participants were entered into a lucky draw
in which four pairs had a chance to win a voucher worth RM60
(approximately £11) each. The questionnaire was administered
through Qualtrics.
Materials
Materials were identical to those used in Study 1, with the
following exceptions. The DG was replaced by the UG. SDO
was measured using the scale developed by Pratto et al. (1994).
The ICE measure of anticipated emotions was simplified by not
varying the recipient’s ethnic identity, and the number of items
was reduced from 12 to 6. When participants were asked how
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they would feel about making different types of allocation, they
were reminded that the rules of the UG meant that the receiver
could reject the allocation. An overall index of ICE was calculated
using the same procedure as in Study 1. Once again, the three
sub-scales (i.e., pride, regret, guilt) were found to be highly
intercorrelated (with bivariate rs ranging from 0.611 to 0.891)
and Cronbach’s alpha for the overall ICE measure was 0.927. The
Cronbach’s alphas for the IIM were also high: IIMMalay = 0.930,
IIMChinese = 0.918, and IIMIndian = 0.940, while that for the SDO
measure was 0.837.
Procedure
A professional translator translated the questionnaire from
English to Malay and the entire questionnaire was presented in
both Malay and English. Participants were first asked to complete
a consent form. They were then asked to provide demographic
information (ethnicity, age, gender, fluency in English and Malay,
and occupation). Next, participants completed the IIM, then
the SVO-SM and the attention check. This was followed by the
SDO measure and the ICE measure. Next, participants played
the UG once with an opponent whose name was randomly
chosen from the three ethnic groups. Each participant played
the role of the allocator and was given a total of 30 tokens,
to be divided between him/herself and the receiver. The names
used were the same as in Study 1 and the assigned receiver was
always the same gender as the allocator. Participants were told
that the receiver would be able to accept or reject the proposed
allocation, and that if the recipient rejected the proposal, neither
the allocator nor the recipient would receive any tokens. On
the other hand, if the recipient accepted the proposal, the
allocator and the recipient would receive what the allocator had
proposed. Participants were told that the tokens had monetary
value in the sense that the points gained would be doubled
and would be paid out in real money if they won the lucky
draw. Participants were then asked whether they had taken
their participation in the study seriously. Finally, participants
were thanked and debriefed. In order to divide the gift voucher
according to participants’ allocation in the UG, we needed to
retrieve the minimal offer that each participant would accept.
However, this information was not collected in the study.
Because of this, each winner was given the maximum amount




Of the 565 participants, data from 371 participants (Mage = 23.05,
SD = 4.06) were retained for analysis. There were 81 males
and 290 females in the final sample. We excluded data from
participants who failed the attention check (N = 62) and
whose response time was either shorter than 2.5 times the median
response time (N = 37) or longer than 2.5 times the median
response time (N = 29). We also excluded participants whose
ethnicity was “other” (N = 1) or mixed (N = 16). Due to the
low number of ethnic Indian participants recruited, data from
these participants (N = 49; nChineseReceivers = 18, nIndianReceivers = 15,
nMalayReceivers = 16) were also not included in our main analyses.
Thus, Chinese (N = 197) and Malay (N = 174) allocators were
included in the data analyses.
As in Study 1, we used non-parametric tests to investigate the
effect of condition on allocation behavior. For the regression-
based analyses (e.g., mediation analysis), we dichotomized the
allocation scores and calculated effects of predictors with logistic
regression, with offers ≥ 15 coded as “fair” and offers ≤ 14 coded
as “unfair.” For all other analyses, t-tests were used. See Table 2
for the correlations between the measures.
A sensitivity test (using G∗Power) showed that the study had
sufficient power (1 – β = 0.80) to find a small effect of Cohen
dz = 0.026 (Cohen, 1969, p. 38).
Allocation Behavior
A Mann–Whitney test was used to investigate whether
participants differed in allocations to ingroup and outgroup
members. Allocations to ingroup members (M = 14.53, SD = 2.96,
Mdn = 15.00) did not differ significantly from allocations to
outgroup members (M = 14.46, SD = 2.84, Mdn = 15.00),
U = 15414.50, Z = −0.19, p = 0.852. Using a Kruskal–Wallis test,
we found that neither ethnic group (Malay or Chinese) differed
significantly in its allocation behavior toward receivers from
the different ethnic groups, χ2Malay(2) = 0.42, p = 0.813 and
χ2Chinese(2) = 0.51, p = 0.775.
Next, we compared the allocation behavior of the majority and
minority group members toward others (irrespective of ethnicity)
using a Mann–Whitney test. Results showed that majority
(M = 14.38, SD = 3.07, Mdn = 15.00) and minority (M = 14.57,
SD = 2.71, Mdn = 15.00) groups did not differ in allocations,
U = 16490.50, Z = -0.76, p = 0.450. This is inconsistent with what
was found in Study 1. We also investigated whether the allocation
behavior of minority and majority group members differed
depending on the social category of the receiver. Mann–Whitney
tests showed that the minority group did not differ in their
allocation behavior toward ingroup (M = 14.55, SD = 2.99,
Mdn = 15.00) and outgroup (M = 14.58, SD = 2.56, Mdn = 15.00)
members, U = 4286.50, Z = -0.71, p = 0.476. The majority
group also did not differ in their allocation behavior toward
ingroup (M = 14.50, SD = 2.96, Mdn = 15.00) and outgroup
(M = 14.32, SD = 3.13, Mdn = 15.00) members, U = 3247.00,
Z = -0.38, p = 0.701.
Using logistic regression, we explored the combined effects
of allocator’s group membership, receiver’s group membership,
TABLE 2 | Means, SDs, and correlations for all key variables in Study 2.
Tokens
allocated
SVO ICE IIM SDO
SVO 0.283∗∗∗ – – – –
ICE 0.301∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ – – –
IIM −0.143∗∗ −0.124∗ −0.093 – –
SDO −0.158∗∗ −0.124∗ −0.325∗∗∗ 0.042 –
M 14.48 31.38 1.00 4.96 43.12
SD 2.88 10.77 1.18 0.96 11.82
Note: N for all variables = 370 except for SDO, where n = 369. ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
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and SVO on tokens allocated to the receiver. Model 1 included
the main effects of the three predictors and was significant,
R2 = 14%, χ2(3) = 31.47, p < 0.001. There was a significant main
effect of SVO score on allocations, b = 0.07, p < 0.001, odds
ratio = 1.07. This shows that participants who scored high on
the SVO measure and were thus more prosocial, were more likely
to make a fair allocation to the receiver. Model 2 and Model 3
included the interactions between the predictors and neither was
significant, Model 2: R2 = 15.3%, χ2(3) = 3.28, p = 0.351, and
Model 3: R2 = 15.4%, χ2(1) = 0.17, p = 0.681. There were no
significant interactions between the predictors.
Using logistic regression, we also explored the combined
effects of allocator’s group membership, receiver’s group
membership, and IIM score on tokens allocated to the receiver.
Model 1 included the main effects of the three predictors and was
not significant, R2 = 2.7%, χ2(3) = 5.86, p = 0.12. However, there
was a significant main effect of IIM score on the tokens allocated
to the receiver, b = -0.32, p = 0.040, odds ratio = 0.73. This
shows that participants who identified more with their ingroup
were less likely to make a fair allocation to the receiver. Model
2 and Model 3 included the interactions between the predictors
and neither was significant, Model 2: R2 = 4.6%, χ2(3) = 4.19,
p = 0.242, and Model 3: R2 = 4.6%, χ2(1) = 0.10, p = 0.755. There
were no significant interactions between the predictors.
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)
A t-test was used to compare Chinese and Malay allocators’
SDO scores. As expected, majority group (Malay) allocators
(M = 44.53, SD = 10.40) had significantly higher scores than did
minority group (Chinese) allocators (M = 41.87, SD = 12.85),
t(367) = -2.17, p = 0.031.
Logistic regression was used to explore the combined effects
of the three predictors (allocator’s group membership, receiver’s
group membership, and SDO score) on allocation behavior.
Model 1 included the main effects of conditions and was
significant, R2 = 5%, χ2(3) = 11.03, p = 0.012. Results revealed
that there were no effects of allocator’s or receiver’s group
membership. The only significant finding was a main effect of
SDO, showing that people with a greater preference for group
hierarchy were less likely to make fair allocations, b = -0.04,
p = 0.003, odds ratio = 0.96. Model 2 and Model 3 included the
interactions between the predictors and neither was significant,
Model 2: R2 = 5.2%, χ2(3) = 0.47, p = 0.926 and Model 3:
R2 = 5.3%, χ2(1) = 0.17, p = 0.683. There were no significant
interactions between the predictors.
Anticipated Emotions as a Mediator
Using the PROCESS macro (Model 4), we examined whether
this association between allocator’s SDO and allocation behavior
was mediated by the ICE measure of anticipated emotions
(see Figure 3). Consistent with the results already reported,
this showed that the overall association between SDO and
tokens allocated in UG was negative and significant. There
was also a significant negative association between SDO
and ICE, showing that participants scoring higher on SDO
anticipated fewer cooperative emotions. Furthermore, there was
a positive and significant effect of ICE on allocation behavior.
FIGURE 3 | Indirect effect of social dominance orientation on dichotomized
averaged tokens allocated to the receiver (irrespective of ethnicity) in the
Ultimatum Game through ICE. **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (Study 2).
Importantly, the indirect association between SDO and allocation
behavior through ICE was significant, b = -0.03, 95% CI
[-0.053, -0.016], and the overall association between SDO and
allocation was no longer significant when controlling for SDO,
suggesting full mediation.
Finally, using the PROCESS macro (Model 4), we again
examined whether the effect of allocator’s SVO on allocation
behavior was mediated by anticipated emotions. The mediation
analysis showed that the effect of SVO on tokens allocated in
UG was significant and positive, b = 0.07, 95% CI [0.043, 0.092].
SVO was a significant predictor of ICE, b = 0.03, 95% CI [0.022,
0.044], and ICE was a significant predictor of allocations, b = 0.84,
95% CI [0.464, 1.224]. In addition, the indirect effect of SVO on
allocation behavior through ICE was significant, b = 0.03, 95%
CI [0.014, 0.049]. However, the direct effect of SVO on allocation
remained significant, b = 0.05, 95% CI [0.028, 0.079], suggesting
partial rather than full mediation.
Discussion
Contrary to predictions, there was no significant difference in
participants’ allocation behavior toward ingroup and outgroup
members in Study 2. This was despite the fact that we changed
from a within-subjects design in Study 1 to a between-subjects
design in Study 2, with a view to eliminating (or at least
reducing) social desirability effects. Furthermore, Study 2 had
a larger sample in an effort to increase statistical power. The
current findings therefore failed to replicate previous research in
which ingroup favoritism was found in social dilemmas assessing
cooperation (Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Balliet et al., 2014). This may
reflect something about the specific cultural context in which the
studies were conducted, a point that we will return to below.
We also sought to replicate the difference in allocation
behavior between majority and minority allocators found in
Study 1, and explored whether SDO played a role as a moderator
of the relationship between majority or minority group
membership and allocation behavior. However, the findings of
Study 2 showed no differences between majority and minority
allocation behavior toward others (regardless of ethnicity).
Nevertheless, majority group participants did score higher
on SDO than minority group participants, as predicted.
Furthermore, there was a significant relation between SDO
scores and allocation behavior, such that those higher in SDO
were less likely to be fair in allocating tokens to others. This
shows that SDO shapes allocation behavior, and further analyses
showed that this effect of SDO on allocation behavior toward
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others was fully mediated by anticipated emotions. This suggests
that those who prefer a hierarchical social order are willing to
distribute resources unequally because they do not anticipate
feeling negative emotions about doing so.
A possible explanation for the fact that there was no difference
in allocation behavior between majority and minority group
members is the use of the UG instead of the DG in Study
2. The UG is known to have strategic component, in the
sense that allocators face a risk of their proposed allocation of
resources being rejected by the receiver (Charness and Gneezy,
2008). Although this strategic component typically encourages
allocators to offer more than the minimal amount to receivers
in order to avoid rejection (Scheres and Sanfey, 2006), there
was no evidence that participants were more generous in their
allocations in Study 2 than they were in Study 1, which casts
doubt on this explanation.
Another possible explanation for the absence of the predicted
effects of social category and majority–minority group status is
that all participants were university students. Although students
are segregated based on religion and hold stereotypes about
outgroup members (Mustapha et al., 2009; Tey et al., 2009),
it is also the case that students are more tolerant about
multi-ethnic interactions than are secondary school students
(Tey et al., 2009). The latter researchers found that University
of Malaya students’ perceptions of inter-ethnic relations became
more positive between 2002 and 2008, although there was
still evidence of ethnocentrism among these students (Tey
et al., 2009). In addition, researchers found that university
students do not see ethnic tension as a racial issue, but rather
they believe it has become a norm in the Malaysian society
(Mustapha et al., 2009). The same researchers argued that
because of their academic background university students are
more tolerant and understanding toward other ethnic groups
(Mustapha et al., 2009).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main aim of these studies was to systematically vary
the ethnic group membership of receivers in an economic
game setting to see whether this would influence participants’
allocation behavior. There was no evidence of this predicted
effect in either study. As noted above, the absence of ingroup
bias in allocation behavior may have been due to impression
management and social desirability concerns (Study 1) or the
use of a university student sample that is likely to have more
liberal social attitudes (Study 2). A further possibility is that
the manipulation of group membership (through the use of
ethnically marked names) was too subtle, although the strong
link between ethnicity and the names used makes this less
plausible. Given the consistent lack of any empirical support for
the predicted effect of group membership, another possibility is
that the influence of group membership on allocation behavior
in economic games is absent in the Malaysian context, despite
the fact that it has been found in other cultural contexts (Whitt
and Wilson, 2007; Efferson et al., 2008). A final possibility is that
by individualizing the receiver (by giving him or her a name),
the procedure used in the current studies may have inadvertently
enhanced fair behavior, because participants may have been
more reluctant to act unfairly toward a named individual than
they would have been if the recipient had been anonymous
(as recipients generally are in economic games). Past research
has indeed found that DG allocators give more to a named
receiver than to an anonymous one (Charness and Gneezy, 2008),
although research has also shown that the effect of identifiability
on allocators’ generosity in intergroup DGs varies as a function of
intergroup relations, such that the tendency to be more generous
to identifiable ingroup members is not found in cohesive groups,
perhaps because in highly cohesive groups, the prototypicality
of a group member is more important than his or her personal
attributes (Ritov and Kogut, 2017).
A second objective of Study 2 was to investigate possible
differences in allocations made by members of majority and
minority groups. Interestingly, the results of Study 1 appeared
to show that allocators belonging to minority groups were more
generous toward others (regardless of the receiver’s ethnicity)
than were majority group members, perhaps reflecting a stronger
preference for equality in social relations (Pratto et al., 1994).
However, this pattern of findings was not replicated in Study 2.
However, Study 2 did reveal that majority group members had
higher SDO scores, and SDO was negatively related to allocation
behavior. Thus, the current studies provide suggestive evidence
that belonging to a majority or minority social group may play a
role in resource allocation behavior, through the relation between
group status and SDO, and the effect of SDO on allocation
behavior. However, it is of course true that the Malays differ
from the Chinese and Indians with regard to many other aspects
besides their majority versus minority group membership (for
example, they differ in cultural norms). Thus, future research
should include a broader range of majority and minority groups.
Furthermore, the effect of group membership status on
allocation behavior in Study 1 and the relation between SDO
and allocation behavior in Study 2 were both fully mediated by
anticipated emotions. As noted above, full mediation suggests
that the influence of individual differences in preferences for
a hierarchical social order on individual and institutional
discrimination operates through their effect on cooperative
and competitive emotions. This provides additional support
for the general argument that anticipated emotions play a key
role in the link between dispositional preferences and resource
allocation behavior.
Most studies in the psychological literature study samples
from populations that can be characterized as WEIRD (Western,
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic), meaning that
the findings may not generalize to people living in the rest of the
world (Henrich et al., 2010). One of the strengths of the current
research is that we replicated some of the key findings reported
by Bono et al. (unpublished) using a population from a non-
Western country. This helps to establish the generalizability of
the mediating role played by anticipated emotions in the relation
between SVO and allocation behavior.
Some limitations of the current studies need to be
acknowledged. The first names used to manipulate receiver
ethnicity were not pre-tested with respect to their perceived
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cooperativeness or friendliness, which could conceivably
influence allocation decisions (Nett et al., 2020). Future studies
using a similar procedure could have the names rated on
these dimensions to rule out this possibility. Another possible
limitation is that allocators and receivers were always of the same
gender. It may well be that there are differences in mixed-sex
versus same-sex dyads (Eagly and Crowley, 1986). Against this
limitation, it could be argued that keeping the same-gender
interaction consistent is a strength of our procedure because
it avoids introducing another layer of social categorization.
A limitation of Study 2 is the fact that it did not
investigate whether participants differed in their anticipated
cooperative and competitive emotions in relation to ingroup
and outgroup members. This was because the ICE measure
used in Study 2 was not customized to the ethnic identity of
the receivers. Dropping the manipulation of receiver’s social
identity in the ICE measure used in Study 2 was driven by
the need to reduce the length of time needed to complete
the study. Future studies could seek to examine the extent
to which respondents anticipate cooperative and competitive
emotions when allocating resources to an ingroup or outgroup
member. This might provide further insight into the role
of anticipated emotions in mediating the effect of SDO on
allocation behavior.
CONCLUSION
Although the central manipulation of receiver’s social identity
did not influence allocation behavior in the expected way,
there was some indication that the majority/minority status of
allocators and their individual difference in preference for status
hierarchies does influence allocations decisions. This reveals
that these factors need to be taken into account in research
on allocation behavior in multicultural settings. Also, the fact
that anticipated emotions played a significant role in mediating
the relation between SVO and allocation behavior is consistent
with the notion that anticipated emotions play a key role in
resource allocation decision making. Finally, the finding that the
negative effect that SDO had on allocations toward others was
also mediated by anticipated emotions speaks to the more general
role of anticipated emotions as a psychological mechanism
that can explain how prosocial and proself dispositions are
expressed in behavior.
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